Dealing with China in Africa Misconceptions: Why China Will Not Take Over Any Country’s Assets.
In Africa-China relationship, while there are valid concerns over transparency and sustainability, it’s essential to separate fact from fiction. Allegations that China is engaged in a covert strategy to “take over” African resources are often based on misinterpretations or selective examples that do not reflect the larger reality of China-Africa engagement. A closer look at data, existing agreements, and the broader global economic context provides a more balanced understanding.
Debt-Driven Development vs. Resource Seizure
One of the misconceptions that has lingered in Africa-China relationship is the issue of debt trap. It’s true that some African nations have borrowed heavily from China for critical infrastructure development, but loan agreements generally do not include clauses permitting asset seizure. Most of China’s loans to Africa are structured with flexible terms, often allowing for renegotiation or deferment. In Zambia, for instance, where debt has been a major issue, China has deferred payments multiple times without seizing copper mines or other assets. The Ugandan government and Chinese lenders have also dismissed allegations of Entebbe airport been seized by Chinese.
Research show that China has restructured, rescheduled, or forgiven around $10 billion in debt across the continent over the past two decades. For instance, during the COVID-19 pandemic, China forgave the interest-free loans of multiple African countries, demonstrating flexibility rather than aggressive debt collection tactics. Despite this facts and analysis, anxieties about china’s debt trap continue to circulate in media reports.
Africa is an active Player in Sino-African Relations
Africa is not a passive player in its dealings with China. Many African leaders actively negotiate and re-negotiate terms to ensure their country’s interests are protected. Take Kenya’s Standard Gauge Railway as an example: the project, initially funded by China, is managed by Kenyan authorities and runs under government oversight. These projects are results of mutual agreements where African governments have ownership over implementation and management, making the concept of “takeover” difficult if not impossible.
Moreover, the African Union and individual countries increasingly employ standardized contractual safeguards and independent auditing. The African Development Bank and other institutions also play a role in monitoring the terms of Chinese-financed projects, helping African nations retain autonomy over assets and projects.
The term “debt-trap diplomacy” has become a buzzword, suggesting that China lends money to countries with the intent to seize assets upon default. However, scholars and institutions have found little evidence to support this theory. Out of over 1,000 Chinese loan agreements reviewed, only one case involved asset transfer (Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port), which is not even a debt-to-equity swap but a lease by the Sri Lanka government to help improve “primary surplus and strengthen foreign currency reserve position” as said by former President Ranil Wickremesinghe. This is not representative of a systematic strategy but rather a specific, isolated incident.
China in Africa
China’s role as a creditor to Africa is not as predominant as perceived. Africa’s debt to China accounts for only about 12% of the continent’s total external debt, according to the World Bank. Institutions like the IMF and private Western creditors hold much larger shares, yet it is often China that receives the blame for Africa’s high indebtedness. Also, multilateral debt relief initiatives, like the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) led by the G20 during the pandemic, show that China is willing to work with global partners in debt restructuring and relief. Under this initiatives China deferred the largest amount of debt repayment of all G20 countries, by suspending $1.35 billion in debt repayment for 23 DSSI countries.
China’s engagement in Africa goes beyond loans, China has heavily invested in infrastructure projects that fosters long-term development. Roads, railways, ports, and energy facilities have been built across the continent, helping improve connectivity and economic growth. The African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) benefits immensely from these infrastructural advancements, boosting intra-African trade which was not so initially due to inadequate infrastructure.
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), for instance, has led to investments across Africa that foster regional integration. Projects like Ethiopia’s Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway are vital trade corridors and are co-owned by African governments. In Nigeria, Chinese built railways have reduced travel time between key cities, bolstering commerce and reducing transportation costs for local businesses.
When it comes to addressing environmental and social concerns, it’s undeniable that environmental and social concerns arise in sectors like mining, where Chinese companies and individuals are present. However, illegal activities by rogue companies and individuals should not be conflated with the Chinese state’s intentions. For example, illegal gold mining or “galamsey” in Ghana, while involving some Chinese nationals, is overwhelmingly perpetuated by local actors. Internal conservative estimates would put the number of local participation in the whole chain of illegal mining, whether directly or indirectly, at over one million, whereas there are at most several hundred thousand Chinese in total, hardly a plausible scapegoat for illegal mining. This points to broader governance challenges rather than an orchestrated takeover. Illegal mining in Ghana is a complex issue involving many local actors, often with significant local complicity. Some Ghanaian citizens and businesses actively participate in or facilitate illegal mining operations, seeing it as a way to meet gold demands and create jobs in areas with limited economic opportunities.
These dynamics suggest that the issue is not purely driven by foreign actors but rather rooted in local challenges that need stronger regulatory oversight and economic alternatives. Recognizing the need for responsible mining, China has increasingly supported environmentally sustainable practices. The Chinese government has recently implemented policies to ensure its companies comply with local laws and international standards, both at home and abroad hence illegal mining in Ghana cannot be attributed to China or foreign actors.
Conclusion
Africa’s relationship with China has complexities that cannot be reduced to a narrative of exploitation or takeover. While there are legitimate concerns around governance, transparency, and debt, many of these challenges are also evident in Africa’s dealings with other global powers. China has consistently shown a willingness to negotiate debt relief, support infrastructure growth and demonstrated that its approach is one of partnership rather than subjugation.
The path forward lies in building robust frameworks for cooperation that reflect Africa’s aspirations and agency in a globalized world. As the discussion about the threats posed by Chinese loans lingers large, it will be of more benefit if we become less concerned about asset seizures and more about our own leaders’ accountability and the economic consequences of irresponsible borrowing. Creditors, too, should adopt a balanced approach, flexible but firm to avoid encouraging fiscal irresponsibility.
Co-Author:
Mercy Tedeku
Research Associate, Africa-China Centre for Policy & Advisory
